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TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 





The paper analyzes the financial structure of outbound FDI during the period 1996-2002 by 
drawing on up to 54,022 firm-year observations of 13,758 German-owned subsidiaries. We 
find that the tax rate in the host country has a sizeable and significantly positive effect on 
leverage for wholly-owned foreign unlike partially-owned foreign companies. Most of the 
effect comes from increased intra-company borrowing, while third-party debt is not 
significantly affected by tax differences. While wholly-owned subsidiaries react more 
sensitively to tax rate differentials, they are less sensitive to macroeconomic influences like 
interest rates. 
JEL Code: F23, H25. 
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1 Introduction 
The extent to which taxes influence the financial structure of firms has been subject to debate. 
In theory, high corporate tax rates invite firms to finance their investment with debt since 
interest expenses, often unadjusted for inflation, are deductible from corporate taxable 
income, thereby providing a tax shield. Until recent years, empirical evidence showing the 
dependency of financing structures was often lacking, prompting Myers (1984) to raise doubt 
if there would ever be such evidence.
1  
  However, in the past decade and a half several studies of corporations in a domestic 
context have been successful in identifying tax effects. MacKie–Mason (1990) found that the 
marginal source of finance was influenced by the effective corporate tax rate by exploiting 
differences in the loss carry-forward position of firms.
2 For firms with high loss carry-
forwards the tax deductibility of interest has a lower value than for profitable firms. MacKie–
Mason also showed for a sample of U.S. corporations that firms with high loss carry-forwards 
indeed used less debt at the margin. Givoly et al. (1992) used a similar method and show a tax 
influence by looking at the natural experiment of the U.S. 1986 tax reform act. Gentry (1994) 
compared U.S. firms that operate in special industries and can avoid the double taxation under 
the U.S. corporate tax system with other firms that are subject to double taxation of corporate 
profits. Indeed the first group of corporations shows a significantly different financing 
behavior. Graham (1999) argued that empirically the tax rate of the personal investor plays a 
role in corporate financing decisions. Gordon and Lee (1999) exploited the fact that in the 
                                                 
1 In his presidential address to the American Finance Association Myers said, “I know of no study clearly 
demonstrating that a firm‘s tax status has predictable, material effects on its debt policy. I think the wait for such 
a study will be protracted.” 
2 A similar result on tax loss companies is found in Bartholdy, Fisher and Mintz (1987) who also provided 
evidence that an increase in the federal-provincial statutory corporate tax rates resulted in the debt-to-asset to rise 
by 0.4 percentage points.       2 
U.S. smaller corporations are granted a lower corporate tax rate and find a significant effect of 
this lower rate. Finally, Gropp (2002) showed a sizeable tax effect on the financing of 
marginal corporate investment by exploiting local tax differentials for German firms. 
  When it comes to international investments only a few studies have dealt with the 
relationship between corporate taxes and debt and most have used data on U.S.-owned 
affiliates (Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003)). One exception is 
Jog and Tang (2001). Using Finance Canada data, they found that Canadian-controlled and 
US-controlled multinationals debt was significantly influenced by corporate tax rate 
differentials with the United States.  Another exception is Ramb and Weichenrieder (2004) 
who consider tax differentials of parent companies for explaining intra-company loans of 
foreign-owned affiliates in Germany (German inbound FDI), including a majority of non 
U.S.-owned firms.   
  The following study uses a large panel set on German outbound FDI to reconsider the 
flexibility of financial structure with respect to taxation. Consistent with other studies we find 
that the fraction of debt in total assets is positively related to the host country’s corporate tax 
rate and the estimated marginal effects are of approximately the same magnitude. More 
precisely we find that a 10 per cent increase in the host country’s corporate tax rate leads to a 
5.6 percentage point increase in the debt ratio of wholly-owned manufacturing
3 firms.  
  We also find two other results of interest.  The first is that partly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries react little to corporate income tax rate variation.  We speculate that this might 
arise from a conflict between the majority and minority shareholders that would need to be 
resolved through governance procedures.  The second result is that German-owned 
subsidiaries will adjust their internal financing from affiliates rather than their third-party debt 
when the corporate tax rate varies. 
                                                 
3 Manufacturing is broadly defined in the data to include mining and utility companies.   3 
  
2 Descriptive Statistics 
To study the tax effects on financial structure we selected from the micro data base of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank those firms that were operating in one of 68 countries for which we 
could collect reliable tax rate information and were operating in manufacturing. We also 
dropped branches, which are a minor form of conducting foreign operations in manufacturing. 
The firms in the Bundesbank database are owned either directly or via a holding company 
abroad (indirectly). All firm observations come from the years 1996 to 2002. Data on years 
before 1996 are in principle available but the panel structure has been lost due to data 
protection measures. This leaves us with 13,758 firms that on average are observed over 3.9 
years.  
  German investors owning foreign affiliates are legally required to report on their 
foreign operations if it meets mild size and ownership requirements.
4 These reports are the 
basis for a recent data base by the Deutsche Bundesbank (see Lipponer 2003). Most of the 
information in the data refers to a reduced set of balance sheet information. On the liability 
side, which is on the forefront of this study, there is information on paid-up plus non-paid-up 
equity, capital reserves, loss carry-forwards, current profits net of taxes, debt, liabilities to 
German affiliated companies, liabilities to foreign affiliated firms, and other liabilities. Figure 
1 gives an overview of several financial ratios and their development during the period 1996 – 
2002. The left hand side graphs refer to German-owned affiliates that are directly held by a 
German parent firm. The graphs on the right-hand side refer to the sample of firms that are 
held indirectly via a foreign holding company. The financial ratios have been constructed by 
dividing the respective balance sheet items by balance sheet total. Each of the panels includes 
                                                 
4 There is a yearly reporting requirement for wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries if total assets of the foreign  
subsidiary exceed the equivalent of €3 million (DM 1 million in years before 2002).    4 





and the median.  
  All panels show that, at least for the respective median firm, financial ratios have been 
pretty stable over the period 1996-2002. For some firms, equity or debt can reach more than 
100 per cent of balance sheet total as is indicated by the 5
th centiles in Figures 1b, 1g, and 1h. 
Technically, this is feasible if a firm has loss carry-forwards or current losses that enter 
negatively on the liability side of the balance sheet. A somewhat unusual feature of the 
balance sheets collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank is that they contain the yearly after-tax 
profit prior to dividend distributions as a separate part of the equity of the firm. Therefore, the 
balance sheets provide information on current profits even though the data base does not 
contain formal profit and loss statements. For the median firm, current profits net of taxes are 
around two per cent of balance sheet total in all years, but at least five per cent of the firms 
have profits of nineteen per cent or more. This is mirrored by a similar fraction of firms that 
have a current loss of more than 20 per cent of total assets. The median debt-to-asset ratio is 
between 53 % and 58%. For more than five percent of the directly and indirectly-held firms, 
debt exceeds total assets. Since losses may dramatically reduce total assets, which serve as the 
denominator of the debt ratio, debt ratios can become extremely high and the data set even 
contains eight observations with debt ratios exceeding ten.  
  While directly and indirectly-held manufacturing firms show quite similar financing 
patterns for equity and total debt, they differ strongly when it comes to intra-company loans. 
As panel 1i shows, the median firm in the directly held sample has no liabilities against 
affiliated firms outside Germany and 75 per cent of the firms have less than three per cent of 
their assets financed by those liabilities. This is different when we turn to those firms that are 
held via an intermediate foreign holding. For at least 25 per cent of these firms, liabilities 
against affiliated companies outside Germany account for 28 per cent of total assets or more. 
When we look at the liabilities against German affiliated companies (including the parent),   5 
then we see the opposite: the median indirectly owned firm does not owe money to a German 
firm, while this is the case in the sample of directly-held firms.  
 
Figure 1: The Financial Structure of German-owned Subsidiaries  
(fractions of balance sheet total) 
 
Figure 1a: Paid-up capital and capital reserves, directly-held 
subsidiaries 
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Figure 1c: Profit and loss carry-forwards,  
directly-held subsidiaries 
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Figure 1e: Current profits after taxes, before dividends,  
directly-held subsidiaries 
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Figure 1g: Total debt,  
directly-held subsidiaries 
Figure 1h: Total debt,  
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Figure 1i: Liabilities against foreign affiliates,  
directly-held subsidiaries 
















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
Figure 1k: Liabilities against German affiliated companies,  
directly-held subsidiaries 
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  Figure 2 gives an impression of the amount of assets represented in our sample firms. 
In the last year of our sample, total assets (measured by balance sheet total) of indirectly and 
directly-held firms amounted to € 288 billion. Total assets peaked in the year 2000 and 
declined after the burst of the New Economy bubble. Some part of the further decline in 
reported investment from 2001 to 2002 is due to an increase in the size threshold for the 
reporting requirement. Also, values can shift as exchange rates relative to the Euro (or Mark 
in early years) change overtime.  Figures for directly-held firms have been affected more 
strongly, as directly-held firms tend to be smaller than those held indirectly via a foreign   7 
holding company. When FDI is measured by size, Figure 2 shows a growing importance of 
indirectly-held firms compared to directly-held manufacturing subsidiaries.  
 




















Annotation: The lines refer to total assets (balance sheet total) measured on the right scale. The columns 
indicate the total number of firms measured on the left scale.  
 
We also constructed a panel of corporate tax rates, which resulted in a cross-section of 
68 countries for the combined data set. For all countries the rates reflect the general corporate 
tax rates, including average local taxes, and have been collected at the University of Toronto’s 
International Tax program, using information from Finance Canada, International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation, PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Bureau of Tax Policy Research at the 
University of Michigan, KPMG, and other sources.  
  Figure 3 provides some analysis of the tax rate information in our data set. The left 
panel of Figure 3 shows the distribution of tax rates according to our sample. For the period 
1996 to 2002 the bold line in the middle indicates the tax rate faced by the median firm in 
each year. The two lines above show the rates for the 95 and 75 centiles firms. The two lines   8 
below indicate the rates for the 5
th and the 25
th centiles. The right panel of Figure 3 reflects 
the same centiles but ignores the number of German firms operating in a given country. It 
only reflects the distribution of the unweighted national tax rates.  
    
 
Figure 3: The distribution of Host Country Tax Rates for German-owned Firms 
 
Figure 3a: Tax Rates faced by German-owned Subsidiaries 
(Country Tax Rates weighted by No. of German Firms) 
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As Figure 3b illustrates, the median tax rate in our set of 68 countries has come down from 34 
per cent to 30 per cent and only five per cent of the included countries tax corporations at a 
rate of 40 per cent or higher. While a downward trend is also visible in Figure 3a, this left 
panel suggests that German-owned manufacturing firms are relatively often located in 
countries that have experienced a less pronounced downward trend in taxation. Of the 68 
countries in our sample, 25 experienced no tax rate change during the period 1996-2002, 
while the remaining 41 countries did. The average standard deviation of the sample countries’ 
tax rates equals 1.63 percentage points. 
3 Empirical Results 
  The fundamental hypothesis is that for firms in high-tax countries the benefit of the tax 
shield provided by debt finance is higher than in low-tax countries and therefore leverage   9 
should increase with the local tax rate. To allow for the possibility that directly held firms 
react differently to a tax change than indirectly-held firms, which are held via an intermediate 
holding company, we started with two tax variables. CTXDIR is zero if the firm under 
consideration is indirectly held but equals the foreign corporate tax if the firm is held directly. 
Conversely, CTXINDIR takes on the value zero if the firm is directly held by the German 
parent, but equals the host country’s corporate tax rate otherwise.  In cases in which the 
restriction CTXDIR = CTXINDIR was accepted by a Wald test we introduced the new 
variable CT, which equals the corporate tax rate. To allow for tax effects that are nonlinear in 
taxes we also introduced squares of the tax variables (CT2 = CT
2, CT2XDIR = CTXDIR
2 , 
CT2XINDIR = CTXINDIR
2). To account for non-tax reasons for the amount of leverage we 
use four macroeconomic variables for the host countries: real GDP growth (GDPGROWTH), 
the bank lending rate from the IMF International Financial statistics (IBANK), the host 
country’s nominal inflation rate (INFLATION) and the amount of bank lending to the private 
sector scaled by GDP (DOMPRIVCRED). We expect that growth in the host country should 
make it easier to self finance investment and may have a negative effect on the demand for 
debt. The interest rate should negatively affect the demand for debt, while a higher inflation 
rate (at a given interest rate) reduces the real interest rate and should favour debt. The variable 
DOMPRIVCRED captures the efficiency of the banking sector in the host country and may 
positively affect the amount of debt.  
  Table 1 begins with the determinants of subsidiaries’ overall debt to asset ratio. Three 
different samples are considered. The full sample of all subsidiaries [column (1)-(3)] consists 
of up to 13,758 firms and 54,022 firm-year observations, but is slightly reduced by the limited 
availability of macroeconomic variables for some host countries. Columns (4)-(6) present 
results for up to 9,156 subsidiaries that are wholly-owned by the German investor, while 
columns (7)-(9) include up to 6,023 less than fully owned-subsidiaries. Since the Hausman 
test generally rejected the validity of a GLS model, all regressions use a fixed effects model   10 
with robust p-values, which have been corrected for errors correlated across country 
observations and firm observations (clustering).  
  Model (1) uses the full sample to regress the overall debt ratio on the host country’s 
tax rate and fixed time effects (not reported), while model (2) additionally introduces the 
macro variables discussed above. These simple linear models suggest that a one percentage 
point increase in the host country’s tax rate leads to a .19 to .3 percentage point increase in the 
debt ratio of German subsidiaries. None of the macroeconomic variables in model (2) is 
significant in the full sample of firms and the hypothesis that all four variables are 
insignificantly different from zero is accepted by a Wald test. The increased significance of 
the tax variable CT in model (2) is largely owed to the loss of 1,210 firms in less-developed 
countries for which not all of the four macroeconomic variables are available. Dropping the 
lost observations without including the macro-variables would yield a very similar increase in 
the estimated coefficient. Firms in countries for which the macroeconomic variables are not 
available seem to react with much less flexibility in determining their leverage decision. 
Despite their insignificance, the macro-variables show the expected signs. Growth and 
lending rates reduce reliance on debt while inflation and the liquidity of the banking sector 
increase leverage.  
  As shown by the significantly negative coefficient of CT2 in model (3) there is 
evidence that the tax effect is concave in the tax rate. The estimates imply that a one 
percentage point tax rate increase in the host country causes leverage to rise by .41 percentage 
points (evaluated at sample means).  
  The models (4)-(6) repeat the regressions (1)-(3) but rely only on wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. Throughout, the magnitudes of tax effects are larger than in the full sample. The 
results from model (6) for wholly-owned subsidiaries imply that a one percentage point tax 
rate increase pushes up leverage by .56 percentage points (evaluated at sample means).   11 
  Columns (7)-(9) report results for partly-owned subsidiaries. Here the tax rate loses 
significance, and the marginal effect of the tax rate is largely reduced. At the same time three 
out of four macro variables are now significantly different from zero. Wholly-owned firms, 
that are under the control of a single German investor seem largely independent of credit 
market conditions, while firms with more than one owner have to revert to the external 
funding and are more sensitive to conditions on the debt market. The comparison between 
wholly-owned and partly-owned subsidiaries points to the potential importance of governance 
issues. Since the multinational parent is a related party to an affiliate, conflicts arise in 
determining the appropriate financial policy when unrelated (minority) shareholders are 
involved.  Coordinating several owners' may be difficult if these owners face different 
financing and tax conditions – after all, minority shareholders of a subsidiary do not benefit in 
the same manner from world-wide tax minimization strategies desired by the parent. 
    We now look deeper into the leverage decision by decomposing debt into loans 
received from third parties and loans received from foreign and German affiliated companies 
(including the German parent). Table 2 shows tax and macroeconomic effects on third party 
debt. Since the null hypothesis that the tax rate affects indirectly held and directly held firms 
in the same way was not generally accepted, the variables CTXDIR and CTXINDIR were 
kept and all results separately report the effects on both types of firms. Irrespective of the sub-
sample considered, we find that the tax rate is insignificant in explaining third-party debt. For 
partly owned subsidiaries the estimated coefficients even show consistently the wrong sign. 
Unlike the findings for the overall debt ratio, this result is in stark contradiction to findings for 
U.S.-owned multinationals (Altshuler and Grubert 2003, Desai, Foley, and Hines 2003) that 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    16 
Unlike for overall debt, the bank lending rate (IBANK) is now significant in all 
samples, but as in the case of overall debt, it is more significant for partly-owned subsidiaries 
than for wholly-owned firms. The estimated magnitudes are small, though. A one percentage 
point increase of the interest rate tends to decrease the debt to asset ratio by roughly a tenth of 
a percentage point for wholly-owned firms and some 13 per cent of a percentage point for 
partly-owned firms. The other three macro-variables have the expected signs but are not 
significant.  
Table 3 shows results for the ratio of German loans to balance sheet. Again the models 
that include a quadratic term perform significantly better than simple linear models. While, 
evaluated at the sample means, we always find a positive effect of the tax rate on German 
intra-company loans, the results are not significant for partly-held firms (model 6 – 8). For 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, the coefficients of model (6) imply a marginal effect of the tax 
rate on leverage of .252 for indirectly-held firms and .408 for directly-held firms. For 
example, we can expect that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate leads to a sizeable 
increase in German loans that amounts to 0.25% to 0.41% of balance sheet total.   
  Finally, Table 4 reports on the determinants of loans received from affiliated 
companies outside Germany. Here we find a strong difference between wholly-owned firms 
that are held directly and those that are held via a holding. Only those firms that are held via 
an intermediate holding company show a reaction of their respective debt ratio with respect to 
taxation. Unlike in the previous regressions the tax effect is linear and the inclusion of 
quadratic terms shows insignificant results. A likely reason for this is that even the bulk of the 
indirectly held firms has only a modest ratio of this type of loans to balance sheet total (cf. 
Figure 1l). We also find insignificant results for the sub-sample of partly-owned firms. 
Macro-variables seem to play an insignificant role for the magnitude of loans received from 
affiliated companies outside Germany in all samples.      17 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper is one of the first studies that empirically analyze the effect of company taxes on 
complex multinational financial decisions and it is especially unique in using non-American 
data. Unlike most previous studies we have relied on statutory corporate tax rates rather than 
implicit tax rates derived by dividing tax payments by pre-tax profits. Despite these 
differences our estimates are largely in line with results derived from U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries. We find that a one percentage point increase in the host country’s tax rate 
increases the debt to asset ratio by some .3 to .57 percentage points. This result is broadly 
comparable to results of U.S. studies (Altshuler and Grubert (2003); Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2003)) and a Canadian study using statutory tax rates (Jog and Tang (2001)). However, when 
it comes to the specific instrument of financial flexibility, German-owned subsidiaries rely 
almost exclusively on intra-company loans, while in U.S. studies the marginal effect of a tax 
change has turned out to be larger for third-party debt.  
  Our study is the first that separately analyzes wholly-owned subsidiaries and partly-
owned subsidiaries. While wholly-owned firms experience a significant tax effect on their 
financial leverage, this is not the case for German subsidiaries that are less than 100% owned 
affiliates. This squares with the observation that the major instrument of flexibility is the use 
of intra-company loans. Coordination of (tax-) efficient intra-company (related-party) loan 
strategies seems more difficult to achieve when there minority shareholder interests are to be 
protected.     18 
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